The original essays in this volume call into question the simplistic strategy of characterizing religion by some abstract set of propositions and then judging it by means of an independently determined standard of rationality.

This dissertation consists in three essays, one in ethics, one in action theory and one at the intersection of these fields. The first essay concerns romantic love, and makes explicit both the psychological needs people commonly expect it to service and the robust yet conditional commitment it demands. The basic ideas are the following: people regularly want to form an intimate union with another, to be loved for properties of certain sorts, and to have this love generate and sustain a (...) distinctive sort of commitment to them. In particular I argue that the third idea has been underarticulated and underappreciated, and its underappreciation has given rise to seeming inconsistencies amongst peoples' wishes for lasting loving relationships. I close with a detailed account of what I term a "loving commitment." ;The second essay is devoted to a detailed examination and assessment of the Doctrine of Double Effect . I argue that in order to employ the DDE to obtain intuitively satisfying moral evaluations it needs to be supplemented by an additional principle or set of principles that specify how various aspects of the relevant action are to be classified as intended or merely foreseen. After discrediting various plausible candidates I offer a puzzle case that seems peculiarly prone to mischaracterization by the DDE. I close with some tentative suggestions as to how the DDE should be considered against the backdrop of our moral practices. ;The third essay is a detailed examination of intention, belief, intentional action, and planning, and the relations obtaining between them. I contend that plans are nothing more than clusters of intentions of greater and lesser range and immediacy and that practical rationality essentially consists in forming and acting on intentions. I then argue that while intentionally acting does not require an intention to perform that very act, Michael Bratman's powerful argument to that effect is ultimately unsatisfying. I propose that the two phenomena diverge because there is a justified belief requirement on intention that does not apply to acting intentionally, and that this justified belief requirement is tied to the intimate relation between intention and rationality. I go on to consider other features of intention, most notably its relations to skillful and habitual activity. (shrink)